Joachim de Villiers and Walter Sebastian

Modern Tokyo Times

It is abundantly clear that Japan currently faces the usual see-saw of regional nationalism which shows itself from time to time in northeast Asia. Territorial disputes are never ending despite positive periods of regional momentum. Therefore, the Mekong Delta should become a prime area whereby Japan can build powerful and friendly ties which in turn strengthens Japan’s geopolitical position.

Prime Minister Noda alongside other senior politicians in Japan desires to expand the influence and power of Japan internationally because of many important factors. Last year in 2011 the government of Japan announced that they would provide major funds for all nations within this part of south-east Asia. With this in mind Japan pledged two trillion yen to the region provided the major focus was on redevelopment, the infrastructure, transportation and all relevant areas.

The name of this idea is called the “southern corridor” and clearly from a geopolitical point of view it makes sense for Japan. Likewise, regional nations need major economic support and for outside powers to increase their influence in order to reduce the power of China. The linkage of the “southern corridor” also bodes well for future economic development throughout the Mekong Delta. Therefore, major linkages will be implemented whereby Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam), Bangkok (Thailand), Phnom Penh (Cambodia) and ultimately the Dawei Seaport (Myanmar) will create powerful economic hubs which help to regenerate many areas throughout the entire region.

Another major bonus of developing the infrastructure and transportation system of the Mekong Delta is that piracy in the Malacca Straits would be bypassed. Other important areas would also enhance trade and create a much needed new economic buzz. Likewise parts of India would be opened up for trade and the construction boon that would entail would also boost regional nations like Cambodia and Myanmar.

In an earlier article by Modern Tokyo Times it was stated that “Not all the two trillion yen will be given to this sole project but clearly this was an important aspect of the pledge to ASEAN. Therefore, the construction of highways, roads, and ports, would help the entire region and reduce costs. Also, it is a reminder to China that Japan is waking up from a deep sleep because the “quietist policy” appeared to hinder Japan’s long term prospects.”

“Of course, the economic factor is the main concern and Japan values economic trade with China and hopefully in the future both nations will increase economic and political initiatives. However, often in the past it seemed that Japan lacked real resolve and this can be seen by China developing relations with many African nations because a vacuum existed.”

Yet Japan should not have allowed such a vacuum to have existed in the first place because this nation developed well before China. In important economic and geopolitical issues which are taken to the United Nations and other powerful bodies. It is clear that Japan is lagging behind the political angle of China’s economic policy into Africa and other parts of the world. This does not imply that Japan should become too focused on China. Despite saying this, it is also clear that Japan needs more political clout by utilizing both the economic power of this nation and all areas related to soft power. If Japan lacks a counter balance to other regional players then this means that this weakness will be exploited.

Naoyuki Fukuda wrote in The Asahi Shimbun, that “The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is taking a leading role in infrastructure export policy, is aggressively seeking ways for Japanese manufacturers to set up bases in India, a vast market with high annual growth.”

“If a parts supply chain could be established between Japan and India through the southern corridor, Japanese parts manufacturers would reap huge benefits,” said a high-ranking ministry official.”

“A major point for the corridor’s construction will be the development of the economic special zone at Dawei in Myanmar, which currently has no overland routes to Thailand.”

If everything works according to plan then the “southern corridor” will become extremely important to Japan. This applies to the Mekong Delta and with India on the horizon and looming large. Therefore, many Japanese companies will be hoping that many complex hurdles will be overcome in order to boost economic trade and opportunities. At the same time the government of Japan will gain enormously based on geopolitical factors. Given this reality, the “southern corridor” is clearly a win-win situation providing all the pieces in the jigsaw can be put together.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201111190032 　The Asahi Shimbun

http://moderntokyotimes.com

Free Burma Rangers

Karen State, Burma

We are relaying this update out from where we are on relief missions in Karen State, Burma. In spite of positive changes in Burma; such as release of many political prisoners, easing of restrictions on the press, and beginning of ceasefire talks with Shan, Chin, and Karen groups, the Burma Army continues its attacks in some ethnic areas and resupplying in all areas.

Here in Karen State there is no ceasefire yet in spite of talks between the Burma Army and the pro-democracy Karen resistance- Karen National Union (KNU). In Northern Burma over 40,000 Kachin villagers have been displaced by ongoing attacks in an offensive by over 100 Burma Army battalions. Tonight, Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan team members here all expressed concern that the attacks against the Kachin, while ceasefire talks were being held with other groups, was a continuation of the government’s divide and rule strategy. They asked, “While the army offers talks with us and then attacks the Kachin, how can we believe they are sincere?”

Among the many patients we treated here recently, there were a little boy who was burned and a mother in labor whom we could provide funds for treatment, but could not fully treat in the jungle. But because of the KNU, we were able to send the mother through Burma Amy lines to a hospital and to make arrangements for the boy to be sent out later. The resistance is strong in these areas and is limiting Burma Army attacks on villages. The situation in other ethic areas varies from the ability to hold back the Burma Army and provide services, to just holding on and trying to survive. In all areas, wherever people choose to resist together, there is freedom and this freedom shines as a beacon of hope throughout Burma and to the whole world. Earlier, during Christmas here, I was giving out gifts and I asked if anyone needed anything else. We all stopped still when one of our lady medics, Hsa Kae (Shining Star), said, “I want my father and mother.” When she was 16 years old, on Christmas Day, her parents were shot dead in their home by the Burma Army. I went over to her, held her hand and prayed. I told her I was sorry. She looked at me and said, “It is ok,” and as I looked into her eyes, she smiled. Hsa Kae has chosen in the midst of her sadness to reach out and help others.

All of us can reach out and help respond to the current changes with prayer, openness, unity and confidence in the truths we stand on: that people were made to be free, that love is the greatest power of all, that justice must be done and that reconciliation is the only way to real peace. We have sent the letter below to the government of the Union of Myanmar (Burma).

Our 59 relief teams from 11 different ethnic groups – Karen, Karenni, Kayan, Pa-Oh, Naga, Kachin, Chin, Lahu, Arakan, Mon, and Shan – continue to bring help, hope and love to people under attack, to shine a light on the situation, and to build up young leaders for freedom, justice and reconciliation in Burma. As one of our new Rangers said about the uprising in 1988, “Now I realize that we made a mistake in 1988 by not showing the Burma Army generals love. The students called for punishment and the generals reacted by cracking down until today. The next time, we must show love and forgiveness to the generals. Then we will win.” We have been praying for change in Burma based on this kind of love and are supporting the process of dialogue, understanding, and, we hope, an end to the conflict. But it has not ended and we will keep giving help, hope and love to those in need and doing our best to shine a light.

Images from this article show a young boy badly burnt and please note that this image should not be viewed by children. http://www.freeburmarangers.org/Reports/2012/20120116.html

Please support Free Burma Rangers

www.freeburmarangers.org

James Jomo and Lee Jay Walker

Modern Tokyo Times

In 2011 many political convulsions have challenged nations in North Africa and the Middle East. The optimism of the so-called “Arab Spring” remains to be unfulfilled because you have so much uncertainty in nations like Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia. At the same time the death of Osama bin Laden wasn’t the decisive blow to international terrorism because recent events in many nations show that this menace is still potent. This notably applies to the recent slaughter of Christians in Nigeria by Islamists belonging to Boko Haram.

Images of Christians, Muslims, and secularists, celebrating political change in Egypt seems like a distant dream. After all, many Coptic Christians have been killed and a sizeable minority of Muslims supported an Islamic party which seeks to restrict the role of Christians in Egypt.

President Obama, much like the ethical policy of Tony Blair (past leader in the United Kingdom), showed his hand clearly by announcing a huge military deal with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, any notion of democracy and supporting human rights was thrown out the window. In fairness to Obama this is a systematic reality within the body politic of America. However, it makes a mockery of his ethical stances because in the land of Saudi Arabia not one single Buddhist temple is allowed or Christian church and of course all apostates from Islam face death in this nation.

Meanwhile the Euro crisis and the foundations of the European Union have been challenged to the hilt. This applies to one economic crisis after another and monetary issues will continue to be a major issue in the early months of 2012. At the same time political leaders have lost power in Greece and Italy and European technocrats who have been unelected now rule the roost in these two nations. Therefore, the “Arab Spring” appears to be ushering in “a non-democratic new dawn” while in Europe new leaders can obtain power despite being unelected – not a pleasant thought.

On a more positive note you now have a new nation called South Sudan and providing the international community supports this new entity, then some “rays of sunshine” will have happened in 2011. However, the path ahead is fraught with danger because Arab Islamists in Khartoum still desire to rule the many different African ethnic groups which comprise of Sudan. This means that bloodshed will continue in 2012 in places like Darfur and the fear is that the Khartoum government may seek to create instability in South Sudan because of the delicate nature of this new nation. Given this, the international community must develop mechanisms with political leaders in South Sudan in order to help this new nation and to guarantee its future, while major obstacles are being challenged by central forces in Juba.

The Russian Federation and Kazakhstan are entering 2012 with certain levels of uncertainty. This applies to political challenges and outside meddling from international powers which seek to cause mayhem internally. Therefore, the world is waiting to see if Putin can remain all powerful alongside Medvedev or if “the house of cards” will collapse because of external and internal agitation.

The forgotten Serbian Orthodox Christians in Kosovo still face a bleak future because they can’t freely travel around Kosovo. At the same time, power processes are against the Serbian Orthodox Christians of Kosovo and political leaders in Belgrade have to walk a tightrope – but, if the current leaders could abandon their brethren in Kosovo, it would appear that they would do so in order to enter the EU club. However, internal events and a backlash could alter the political landscape in Serbia and this is the main concern of the current political leadership in Belgrade. This means that the ghettoization of an entire religious and ethnic group will continue in the heart of Europe and what does this tell us about the new Europe?

In Myanmar the international media is focusing on current positives because political elites in this nation appear to be opening up. Yet, despite this, many minority ethnic and religious groups are still being persecuted and Free Burma Rangers continues to highlight the reality on the ground. The fear is that these minority ethnic groups will be further abandoned in order to establish short-term goals. Also, if the regime turns away from China – then minorities have much to fear from further abandonment and isolation.

Therefore, the mainly Christian Karen elites and other ethnic groups like the Shan and Chin will continue to face an uncertain future. At the same time, the majority of the international media will give scant coverage outside of issues related to Aung San Suu Kyi and issues related to the current leaders of Myanmar.

Madness sadly hit Norway in 2011 when Anders Breivik killed 77 people in Oslo. The reason for this barbaric attack was then manipulated like a political football but the truth is that this individual was clearly deranged. He was neither a Bible thumping individual nor a regular churchgoer but this didn’t stop the anti-Christian brigade from having a field day. However, the bare fact is that the majority of people he killed were white Norwegians and Christian – this hardly matches the “mad racist” and “devout Christian” image which was being brandished about. Indeed, Breivik stated that  ”I’ve always been very pragmatic and influenced by my secular surroundings and environment.”

Sadly, the gruesome murder of innocents was lost and the massacre committed by Anders Breivik was clearly aimed at a political party he detested. The events of this day will never be forgotten in Norway because it highlighted the weakness of security agencies because one individual managed to throw the entire nation into deep shock. Hopefully, Anders Breivik will never be released from prison and different ethnic and religious communities will work more closely together in order to show the real spirit of Norway.

Natural disasters hit many nations, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and many others. Therefore, tens of thousands of people died because of natural disasters. The March 11 tsunami which hit Japan was felt all over the world because of the harrowing scenes which were caught on camera. Also, Japan became the first nation in history to be hit by a devastating earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis, at the same time.

The reverberations of the nuclear crisis can still be felt today in Japan and throughout the world. Therefore, the nuclear energy issue became a hot topic and nations like Germany did a u-turn without much thought, irrespective if individuals agree with Germany or not. Ironically, this u-turn will not stop Germany utilizing the nuclear power stations in France but this is a different issue. Meanwhile, the government of Japan is caught between realism, business issues, energy concerns, the green movement, power shortages, a general public which is still divided, and other important factors related to the nuclear sector.

The March 11 earthquake which unleashed the tsunami was truly devastating because tens of thousands of people died. Also, the speed of events shocked people because the tsunami literally destroyed towns and villages that were in its path. Therefore, even today many people are still missing and vast numbers of people are without proper homes in areas hit by the tsunami.

Residents who reside (and who resided) near the Daiichi nuclear power plant in Fukushima continue to face a bleak future. Also, the tourist industry, fisheries, and other important areas which created jobs have been hindered by the devastating events of March 11. Given this, the central government needs to work closely with local governments and various agencies in order to get the region back on its feet.

It isn’t all doom and gloom because many communities have started to fight back and rebuild and this also applies to attracting new investment. Therefore, the picture is very mixed but clearly all positive mechanisms need to work together in order to resolve the major obstacles which people and the local business community still face.

2011 isn’t only based on negative events but clearly the political, economic, and natural disasters, have all unleashed convulsions which still can be felt. In this sense, the early period of 2012 will be a natural continuation. After all, the nuclear ill wind in Japan remains unresolved when it applies to radiation and its impact on the natural environment and on local people. The economic crisis in Europe remains and the same applies to other parts of the world but some positive signs can be felt in some nations. Also, the so-called “Arab Spring” may turn out to be truly democratic in the long-term or it may be a false dawn where Islamists take control and new despots emerge – it is impossible to say either way with confidence.

Nations like Nigeria and Somalia will continue to face the menace of radical Sunni Islamic terrorist attacks and attacks against central forces will continue. Issues related to democracy in China will be monitored more deeply given the current political climate and North Korea will probably remain on the same footing. However, North Korea may implement some economic reforms and the new leader may turn out to be more independent minded. Meanwhile, the political merry-go-round will continue in Japan whereby political leaders in the two main political parties will face internal struggles.

The Olympics in London in 2012 offer a positive note because this event will be watched by billions of people. Also, you have signs that China and Japan will focus on greater economic initiatives which will strengthen cooperation between these two powerful neighbors. Overall, 2012 looks like another stuttering year whereby economic issues and political convulsions will continue to create new major problems.

leejay@moderntokyotimes.com

http://moderntokyotimes.com

Over 20 Villages, 3000 People, Fleeing Burma Army Attacks

Free Burma Rangers

The Burma Army has killed a villager and over 20 villages have fled attacks and mortar fire in Momauk Township, Kachin State. Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 73 under Division 88 has been attacking villages, with troops from Divisions 33, 44, 66 also entering the area. At least 400 Burma Army soldiers have been involved in the attacks, using 120mm and 60mm mortars and machine guns. Fighting in the area has increased and the Burma Army is building at least four new camps, using forced labor. Over 3,000 people have been displaced.

On 18 November 2011 Burma Army LIB 73 under Division 88 fired 120mm mortars at villagers in the KIA Brigade 3, Battalion 15 area (Kachin Independence Army — pro-democracy ethnic resistance). Two hundred Burma Army soldiers came to Hakawn Village on 19 November 2011. Over 20 villages have fled including Hpakawng, Bumwa, Lamaibang, Kadaw, Mandau, Matang, Mamda, Kadaw, Edin Yang, Zinlum Gaji, Pranghkudung, Lawmun, Lawdan, Kawngja Yang, Hkangdung, Kungpi and four other unnamed villages. Some of the houses in these villages have been burned by the Burma Army. People from these villages are fleeing to Kawngrazup, Jahkai and some to Mazuppa Village. There are over 3,000 displaced people in total, some staying in other villagers’ houses, some staying under tarps while many are without blankets or tarps for shelter.

On 26 November 2011 the Burma Army fired 300 rounds of 120mm mortar, two rounds falling near the village of Pranghkudung. One round exploded near the nursery school. On 27 November 2011, 300 troops from Burma Army Division 33 burned Man Chyam Village in Man Si Township.

The Burma Army shot and killed a Kachin farmer, Nang Zin Tawng, age 52, at 4pm on 21 November 2011. Earlier that day, the Burma Army attacked a small KIA force and then came down to a rice field near Kadaw Village.

Many people, including the family of the man killed, had hid in the fields while trying to finish harvesting their rice. The victim and his two sons Nang Zin Naw, age 21, and Nang In La San, age 15, had stayed together for two or three days in their rice field hut while harvesting rice. That evening at 4pm they went to the rice field. The father went ahead as his two sons followed. He saw the Burma Army and ran, and the Burma Army shot him. The two sons heard the shots and returned to the village

We (Kachin FBR team) went to the location of the attack and took pictures and gave the family 300 Yuan (USD 47) to help with funeral costs.

The Free Burma Rangers’ (FBR) mission is to provide hope, help and love to internally displaced people inside Burma, regardless of ethnicity or religion. Using a network of indigenous field teams, FBR reports on human rights abuses, casualties and the humanitarian needs of people who are under the oppression of the Burma Army. FBR provides medical, spiritual and educational resources for IDP communities as they struggle to survive Burmese military attacks.

Kachin Free Burma Rangers,
Kachin State, Burma

Please visit the Free Burma Rangers at www.freeburmarangers.org in order to learn more about the ongoing crisis. The Free Burma Rangers is on the frontline and they need media attention, economic support, and for people to campaign and help the various minorities of Burma who have suffered decade after decade.

All images belong to the Free Burma Rangers

http://www.freeburmarangers.org/Reports/2011/20111129.html  (One image shows an individual who was killed, therefore, adults should not let children see this one image)

Publication: China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 22

By: Ian Storey

The Jamestown Foundation

The introduction of a slew of economic reforms and political initiatives by the Burmese government in the second half of 2011 have significant implications for the carriage of Burmese foreign policy. Indeed, the surprise announcement in September suspending construction of a major Chinese-funded hydroelectric dam is an indication that China’s privileged place in the hierarchy of Burma’s foreign relations―a position it has greatly benefited from since the West shunned Burma in 1988—can no longer be taken for granted. Nevertheless, even as these changes unfold, the two neighbors will seek to maintain close and cordial relations in recognition of inescapable geographical realities and to protect important shared interests.

On November 7, 2010, Burma held nationwide elections for the first time since 1990. Boycotted by the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), as well as armed ethnic minority groups along the country’s periphery, the international community dismissed the elections as fatally flawed and undemocratic. On February 4, the newly convened parliament elected retired general Thein Sein as the country’s first civilian president in nearly five decades.

Thein Sein appointed an administration composed almost entirely of retired generals from the previous military government. In his inaugural address to parliament, the new president highlighted the need to reform the economy, reduce poverty and corruption, end conflict between ethnic groups and the central government and achieve political reconciliation. Widely perceived as lacking a strong power base, few expected Thein Sein to enact anything more than cosmetic changes. Yet since April, his government has followed through on many of these reforms and reached out to Nobel Peace Prize winner and leader of the NLD, Aung Sang Suu Kyi, who was released from house arrest late last year. While no Arab Spring, Thein Sein’s reforms are increasingly being viewed as a genuine attempt to increase political plurality and end the country’s international isolation. While it remains to be seen whether the reform process is durable, it is clear  that after 49 years of authoritarian rule the political landscape of Burma is shifting in a positive direction.

Initially, China viewed the political transition from military to quasi-civilian rule with satisfaction. For several years prior to the election, senior Chinese officials had privately and publically pressed the ruling junta to implement the stalled “roadmap to democracy.” China encouraged Burma to draw up a new constitution that would pave the way for elections, after which the generals could swap their uniforms for civilian garb (“Emerging Fault Lines in Sino-Burmese Relations: The Kokang Incident,” China Brief, September 10, 2009).

China was never really interested in seeing Burma transformed into a genuine multiparty democracy. Above all else, Beijing values stability in its Southeast Asian neighbor. Particularly, China’s interests are to protect its massive investments; secure uninterrupted access to the country’s rich natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals and lumber; ensure the safety of an estimated one to two million Chinese nationals living and working in Burma; and preserve peace and stability along their border, where ethnic armies maintain uneasy ceasefires with the Burmese central government.

During the first six months of the new government, it was business as usual in Sino-Burmese relations. China continued to pour money into infrastructure projects aimed at binding the two economies closer together. In April, for instance, an agreement was inked between the two countries for China to construct a railway from the western seaport of Kyaukphyu to Yunnan Province (The Irrawaddy, April 28). The railway will run parallel to twin oil and gas pipelines funded by China at a cost of approximately $2.5 billion. Once completed in 2013, the pipelines will transport natural gas from the Shwe off-shore field—for which China obtained sole purchasing rights in 2007— and crude oil from the Middle East and Africa [1]. The pipelines will not only bolster the economic development prospects of China’s landlocked southwestern provinces, but also will mitigate China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca and other strategic chokepoints in Southeast Asia, which Chinese security analysts regard as a strategic vulnerability (“China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’,” China Brief, April 12, 2006).

In another indication that all was well in bilateral relations, Thein Sein paid his first state visit, and only his second overseas trip as president, to China in May. The president was accompanied by a large delegation of ministers, senior military officers and businessmen. As is customary on such occasions, Thein Sein lauded the Sino-Burmese paukphaw (fraternal) relationship, noting ties with China were its “closest and most important diplomatic relationship” (Xinhua, May 28). In a joint statement issued on May 28, the two governments upgraded their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership,” and agreed to maintain close high-level contacts, expand trade and investment links and maintain “peace, tranquility and stability” along their 1,300 mile border. In keeping with its two-decade long position as Burma’s principal financial backer, the China Development Bank agreed to provide the Burmese government with a $756 million line of credit (Global Times, May 28).

There was speculation that in return for continued economic aid, Chinese leaders had requested greater access to Burma’s ports in the Bay of Bengal for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (The Irrawaddy, May 25). Although China has been the primary supplier of military equipment to the Burmese armed forces since 1988, the PLAN did not call at a Burmese port until August 2010.  China undoubtedly would like to increase the number of naval ship visits to Southeast Asian ports so PLAN vessels can take on supplies more easily on their way to and from counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. China also may be interested in an expanded naval presence in Burma to protect its oil and gas interests in Kyaukphyu and enhance sea lane security in the Indian Ocean. It is not known how Burma responded to the reported Chinese request.

If the steadiness with which Burma and China maintained their relationship seemed normal, it only served to highlight the abrupt shift that came at the end of September. Thein Sein sent a note on September 30 to parliament announcing the construction of the Myitsone dam in Kachin State had been suspended until 2016 because it was “contrary to the will of the people.” The dam, one of seven being financed by China in Kachin at a cost of $20 billion, would have been the largest in Burma with a reservoir the size of Singapore. The project, valued at $3.6 billion and scheduled for completion in 2019, was designed to generate 4,000-6,000 MW of electricity, of which more than 90 percent would have been exported to China.

In the months leading up to the announcement, the Myitsone development had generated a groundswell of opposition from the armed Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and intellectuals in Rangoon. Located at the confluence of the Maykha and Malikha rivers, the area is considered to be the birthplace of Kachin culture. It is also the source of the iconic Irrawaddy River, which plays a critical role in the transportation and agricultural life of the country.

The announcement blindsided China. In an interview with Xinhua, Lu Qizhou—the president of China Power Investment Corporation, which was building the dam in partnership with Burma’s Ministry of Electric Power and the well-connected Burmese private company Asia World—revealed he had been “totally astonished” by the decision and warned of possible legal consequences (China Daily, October 4).

In the weeks following the announcement, the Burmese government sought to limit the fallout. The state-run press declared that the suspension would not harm bilateral ties, and that China would be adequately compensated (Wall Street Journal, November 16). In early October, Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo was dispatched to Nanning in an attempt to smooth China’s ruffled feathers. China’s reaction was, rather muted. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on Burma to “protect the legal and legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies” (Washington Post, October 4). Meanwhile. Premier Wen Jiabao told Tin Aung Myint Oo that the two sides should “fulfill their promises…and guarantee the healthy development of China-Myanmar cooperation” (Straits Times, October 22). These comments however belie the distress felt by the Chinese government at the abruptness of Burma’s unilateral decision.

Why had Thein Sein decided to suspend the Myitsone project in a move guaranteed to upset Burma’s closest ally? At least four factors influenced his decision.

First, as noted, the dam had generated widespread opposition, which had been fanned due to loosened controls on the print media and Internet. By ordering a halt to the dam’s construction, the government was attempting to show, unlike its predecessors, it was responsive to public opinion. Perhaps more importantly, the government was conscious of the need to pre-empt public demonstrations, which could so easily have turned into anti-government protests, like the September 2007 Rangoon protests that the security forces violently suppressed.

Second, the Myitsone dam site is located near KIO-controlled territory and is in an area of great cultural significance to the Kachin people. The project would have displaced 15,000-20,000 Kachins from their ancestral homeland. In March, the KIO wrote a formal letter to President Hu Jintao calling for the project to be cancelled, citing the risk of conflict should construction continue (The Irrawaddy, June 24). These warnings proved prescient: in June armed clashes erupted between KIO forces and the Burmese military, after the former had tried to prevent materials from China reaching the construction site. As part of the government’s policy of fostering peace with the ethnic insurgents, the suspension of the dam may have been designed to placate the KIO. In this respect the decision may have paid off: fighting between the two sides has since ended, and in mid-November the KIO participated in informal talks with the government regarding a renewal of their ceasefire.

Third, Burma is attempting to repair relations with the West, particularly the United States. It is keen to demonstrate it is not a client state of China and is capable of making decisions in its own national interest, even if these decisions are inimical to Chinese interests. Moreover, Burma—which will assume the rotating chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2014—wants to show its ASEAN partners that it is not beholden to China and that membership of the organization is the cornerstone of its foreign policy. In another signal to ASEAN, this year Burma has pointedly refused to toe Beijing’s line on the South China Sea dispute. China intensively lobbied Burma not to send representatives to a September meeting of ASEAN legal experts in Manila, which was for the purpose of discussing the Philippine proposal to transform the South China Sea into a “Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation” [2]. Despite China’s wishes, Burma sent a representative—only Cambodia and Laos did not.

Fourth, the decision was also motivated by a desire to reduce China’s influence in Burma. Even though the two countries forged a close partnership after 1988, Burma’s generals have always been uneasy about their dependence on China. Over the years, they have tried to reduce this dependence with only mixed success [3]. The Myitsone decision clearly marks the beginning of a concerted effort to lessen China’s political and economic influence. Furthermore, the government also seems to be reacting to increasing Burmese public anti-China sentiment, provoked by concerns over Chinese dominance of the economy and the social and environmental impact of its infrastructure projects, such as the Myitsone dam.

Is Burma in the process of reverting to its pre-1988 policy of neutralism and equidistance from its two giant neighbors China and India?

While this might be the government’s long-term aim, it is important to keep the Myitsone episode in perspective. The project has been suspended, not cancelled, and work could resume in 2016, possibly on two smaller hydroelectric dams that could supply Yunnan with electricity. China remains Burma’s most important economic partner. Bilateral trade reached $4.4 billion in 2010, up 53 percent on 2010, second only to Thailand (Xinhua, May 28). China is also the primary source of foreign investment in Burma, which amounted to $9.6 billion between 1988 and 2010 (Straits Times, February 23). The two governments have shared interests in border stability. China still exerts some influence over ethnic armies in northeast Burma, including the Wa and Kachin, and has played a behind the scenes role in brokering peace talks. China needs Burma’s cooperation to stem the flow of illegal drugs into Yunnan, and to address trans-boundary crime, an issue highlighted by the murder of 13 Chinese nationals on the MekongRiver in October.

Aung San Suu Kyi recently highlighted the important place China occupies in Burma’s foreign relations when she said that despite “bumps and kinks” in the relationship she was “particularly anxious” for good relations with Beijing (South China Morning Post, November 15). This suggests that even if the NLD is given a greater voice in the country’s political affairs, relations with China will still be accorded an important priority.

In view of the tyranny of geography, even as Burma moves to diversify its foreign relations and have Western economic sanctions eased, it will want to keep China on its side and ensure its interests are protected. Bolstered by the Myitsone decision, Burmese environmentalists have called for work on the oil and gas pipelines to Yunnan to be suspended, but such a move is highly unlikely given the economic and strategic importance of the pipelines to China. Yet even as this and other Chinese-funded projects remain untouched, China must surely be anxious that the days of its political and economic primacy may be numbered. When U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s makes her two-day visit to Burma later this week, Beijing will likely be watching closely and judging its implications for Sino-Burmese relations.

Notes:

1. Shwe Gas Movement, “Corridor of Power: China’s Trans-Burma Oil and Gas Pipelines,” September 2009, available at <http://www.narinjara.com/PDF/CorridorofPower.pdf>.
2. Barry Wain, “Towards Peace and Prosperity in the South China Sea: Pathways for Regional Cooperation,” Paper presented at Forum on the South China Sea, Manila, October 17, 2011.
3. Ian Storey, Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The Search for Security, Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2011, pp. 154-158.

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38718&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=4eb55cda9bfa924d162c24686c90f2b9

Please visit The Jamestown Foundation at http://www.jamestown.org for more in depth reports from this highly acclaimed think tank.

Joachim de Villiers and Lee Jay Walker 

Modern Tokyo Times

Prime Minister Noda and other leading politicians are intent on expanding the influence of Japan internationally and the latest pledge of two trillion yen looks very promising. This applies to developing the transportation infrastructure of south-east Asia and creating a new network which will open up the region to Japanese companies and other nations.

The “southern corridor” is intended to link Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam) with Phnom Penh (Cambodia) and Bangkok (Thailand), and ultimately with the Dawei Seaport (Myanmar). Therefore, Japan pledged to give ASEAN two trillion yen in order to create a new economic hub and help with exporting and importing respective goods with India.

Also, given piracy in the Malacca Straits and other factors, then this development would open up parts of India for trade and bypass many negative factors which currently exist. Not only this, nations like Cambodia and Myanmar would benefit greatly and the construction boom would set in motion many other developments.

Not all the two trillion yen will be given to this sole project but clearly this was an important aspect of the pledge to ASEAN. Therefore, the construction of highways, roads, and ports, would help the entire region and reduce costs. Also, it is a reminder to China that Japan is waking up from a deep sleep because the “quietist policy” appeared to hinder Japan’s long term prospects.

Of course, the economic factor is the main concern and Japan values economic trade with China and hopefully in the future both nations will increase economic and political initiatives. However, often in the past it seemed that Japan lacked real resolve and this can be seen by China developing relations with many African nations because a vacuum existed.

After all, modernity happened in Japan first and given the natural resources of many African nations and the need for major economic development, it was essential for Japan to lead the way. Yet this never happened and clearly many African nations have sided with China in the international arena based on politics coming out of Beijing.

Noda, the new leader of Japan, is certainly intent on focusing on the international arena and this can be seen by recent events.  This applies to making positive overtures to South Korea; a possible visit to North Korea providing the abduction issue can be solved; agreement of nuclear reactors being built in Vietnam and other economic initiatives; first ever bilateral naval exercise between Japan and India; deployment of peacekeeping troops to South Sudan; promising to focus on territorial issues with the Russian Federation based on mutual understanding; and other initiatives.

Naoyuki Fukuda, who is a staff writer at The Asahi Shimbun, commented that “The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is taking a leading role in infrastructure export policy, is aggressively seeking ways for Japanese manufacturers to set up bases in India, a vast market with high annual growth.”

“If a parts supply chain could be established between Japan and India through the southern corridor, Japanese parts manufacturers would reap huge benefits,” said a high-ranking ministry official.”

“A major point for the corridor’s construction will be the development of the economic special zone at Dawei in Myanmar, which currently has no overland routes to Thailand.”

The “southern corridor” sounds like a great plan because it will open up the region to major trade and development and India looms large in the minds of many companies. However, you still have many obstacles and this applies to political factors and other areas but the idea does seem feasible.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201111190032　The Asahi Shimbun

http://moderntokyotimes.com

FBR REPORT: Kachin State – Burma Army Burns and Loots Homes in Wai Maw District

Free Burma Rangers

http://www.freeburmarangers.org

 

Fighting between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Burma Army broke out on 9 June 2011, ending a 17-year cease-fire agreement between the two groups. As many as 20,000 people have been displaced by the fighting in Kachin State, according to local networks helping IDPs in Laiza. KIA sources have said that the number of standing Burma Army battalions before the conflict began was 93. Currently there are 113 battalions in Kachin State with more troops on the way, according to KIA sources. Divisions 33, 88, and 99 are currently operating in Kachin State.

On 16 October 2011, approximately 200 Burma Army soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 438 and Infantry Battalion (IB) 121 attacked Nam San Yang Village in Wai Maw District, Kachin State. The soldiers burned over 30 houses and stayed for 3 days in the village occupying the village temple.

All the villagers from Nam San Yang Village have fled their homes and are staying with relatives or in IDP camps in Laiza. Other villagers are living in huts in their fields as it is now harvest time and they do not want to lose this year’s crops. The Burma Army is still patrolling from their nearby camp down into the village making it difficult for the villagers to reclaim their left belongings and farm their fields.

In an earlier report by FREE BURMA RANGERS the following was stated:

On 9 June 2011 fighting started between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Burma Army. The fighting was started by a dispute between the two armies over control of the area surrounding the Chinese-run Taping hydropower projects. This ended the 17-year ceasefire between the two armies. For more information, go to: Fighting in Kachin State ends 17-year cease-fire (http://www.freeburmarangers.org/Reports/2011/20110704.html )

At least 15,668 people in Kachin State have fled their homes for safety along the China-Burma border, according to the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). Most of these people fled because of KIO warnings that there may be fighting in the area. As of now, the Burma Army and KIO have only engaged in small attacks between camps while cease-fire negotiations continue. If the political talks fail, there may likely be more fighting which would cause more people to abandon their homes to seek safety on the border. The Burma Army has sent a total of 68 Battalions to all of Kachin State.

The Free Burma Rangers (FBR), conduct relief, advocacy, leadership development and unity missions among the people of Burma.

Relief: FBR teams provide emergency medical, educational, spiritual, material and general assistance to people who suffer under the oppression of the dictators of Burma. Teams move through out the conflict areas to give aid and comfort and also conduct leadership training, as well as medical, educational, reporting and general capacity building for people inside Burma. Teams also document human rights violations and report to the relevant authorities. Priority of assistance goes to the Internally Displaced People (IDP), of Burma as well as to those who’s villages have recently been attacked by the Burma Army. FBR teams stand in solidarity with those who suffer and assist people of all races and faiths.

Advocacy: FBR reports regularly on the situation inside Burma, sending information to supporters, news media, other NGOs and governments. In addition, FBR supports the annual Global Day of Prayer for Burma.

Leadership: In addition to relief and reporting, other results of the teams’ actions are the development of leadership capacity, civil society and the strengthening of inter-ethnic unity. The FBR conducts leadership development and communications training in order to strengthen civil society, build leadership capacity and develop communications. Communications tools such as radio broadcasts, cassette tapes, print media are used in the ongoing effort for reconciliation and unity.

Ethnic Unity: FBR helps coordinate annual seminars between the ethnic groups of Burma as well as the pro-democracy Burmans.

For more information regarding this attack:

Democratic Voice of Burma - http://www.dvb.no/news/troops-raze-kachin-villages-locals-flee/18666
Christian Solidarity Worldwide - http://dynamic.csw.org.uk/article.asp?t=press&id=1260

http://www.freeburmarangers.org/Reports/2011/20111115.html

Please visit the Free Burma Rangers at http://www.freeburmarangers.org for more information about the ongoing crisis.

All images belong to Free Burma Rangers

Burma: Violations and Humanitarian Crisis Continues in Eastern Burma According To New Report

Christian Solidarity Worldwide

Burma: Kachin and Karen Conflict Escalates As Talk of Change Grows

Christian Solidarity Worldwide  and Free Burma Rangers

Myanmar: Major Reform Underway

Asia Briefing N°127

International Crisis Group

OVERVIEW

Six months after the transition to a new, semi-civilian government, major changes are taking place in Myanmar. In the last two months, President Thein Sein has moved rapidly to begin implementing an ambitious reform agenda first set out in his March 2011 inaugural address. He is reaching out to long-time critics of the former regime, proposing that differences be put aside in order to work together for the good of the country. Aung San Suu Kyi has seized the opportunity, meeting the new leader in Nay­pyi­taw and emerging with the conviction that he wants to achieve positive change. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seems convinced that Myanmar is heading in the right direction and may soon confer upon it the leadership of the organisation for 2014. This would energise reformers inside the country with real deadlines to work toward as they push for economic and political restructuring. Western policymakers should react to the improved situation and be ready to respond to major steps forward, such as a significant release of political prisoners.

In a speech on 19 August, the president made clear that his goal is to build a modern and developed democratic nation. His initial views on what steps are needed were set out in his wide-ranging and refreshingly honest inaugural speech less than six months ago. Some observers have dismissed such talk as “just words”, but in a context of long-term political and economic stagnation they are much more than that. After 50 years of autocratic rule, they show strong signs of heralding a new kind of political leadership in Myanmar – setting a completely different tone for governance in the country and allowing discussions and initiatives that were unthinkable only a few months ago.

These words are now being put into practice. In recent weeks a series of concrete steps have been taken to begin implementing the president’s reform agenda, aimed at reinvigorating the economy, reforming national politics and improving human rights. The political will appears to exist to bring fundamental change, but success will require much more than a determined leader. Resistance can be expected from hardliners in the power structure and spoilers with a vested interest in the status quo. Weak technical and institutional capacities also impose serious constraints on a country emerging from decades of isolation and authoritarianism. It is urgent that those best placed to provide the necessary advice and assistance – the West and multilateral institutions – are allowed to step forward to provide it.

Some observers are still urging caution, putting the focus not on how much is changing but on how much has yet to change. To be sure, a successful reform process is far from guaranteed. There are many fundamental steps that still must be taken, including healing deep ethnic divisions and overcoming the legacy of decades of armed conflict – something the government has yet to fully grapple with – together with addressing adequately ongoing allegations of brutality by the armed forces; the release of political prisoners; restoration of basic civil liberties; and the further lifting of media censorship.

Western countries have indicated that they stand ready to respond to positive developments. At a very minimum, this should include a less cautious political stance and the encouragement of multilateral agencies – including the International Financial Institutions and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – to do as much as possible under their existing mandate restrictions. Similarly, member states should support the broadest interpretation of the EU Council decision on Myanmar rather than the most cautious. As Naypyitaw sets its new course, these small political steps would help to facilitate the provision of ideas that could add momentum to the reforms now underway.

There are already indications that key benchmarks many in the West have insisted on may soon be reached. Military legislators have, for example, supported an opposition motion in the lower house calling on the president to grant a general amnesty for political prisoners. If such a dramatic policy shift occurs, it would need to be reciprocated by those who earlier authorised sanctions. Failure to do so, or to shift the goalposts by replacing old demands with new ones, would undermine the credibility of these policies and diminish what little leverage the West holds. Internal progress on human rights and economic reforms that benefit the country’s citizens should be acknowledged and supported by the international community.

Crisis Group has long held the view that sanctions on Myanmar – targeted and non-targeted – are counterproductive, encouraging a siege mentality among its leadership and harming its mostly poor population. The greater the pace of change, the weaker the rationale becomes for continuing them – or adding more. Many problems remain. There is ample evidence that the army continues to employ brutal counter-insurgency strategies, and in the absence of domestic accountability, calls for an international commission will remain. But it is far from clear that such a body, even if one could be established, would be the most effective way to address abuses at this time or whether its impact would rather be to cause retrenchment in Naypyitaw.

Jakarta/Brussels, 22 September 2011

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/B127-myanmar-major-reform-underway.aspx

Please visit the International Crisis Group at  http://www.crisisgroup.org for more in depth reports from this highly acclaimed think tank which focuses on conflict resolution.

This overview is also available in Burmese

SSA Fighters On The Move

“We were so frightened no one’s going out to work in the fields when morning came,” said a villager from Wan Nim.

Both SSA and local sources were unable to say whether they were fighters, bombers or reconnaissance planes. “They circled the area for a few minutes and flew south to where they came from,” according to an SSA report.

Maj Sai La, the SSA’s spokesman commented the visit was probably aimed at shaking the morale of the local populace.

This was the second time military planes have paid a call since 13 July, when they were presumably on a bombing mission, “Our positions (between the Burma Army and the SSA) were so close to each other, bombing us wouldn’t have failed to endanger their own people,” said a field officer a few days after the July visit. “Also when the Burmese units used smoke to mark their ground positions, our troops were quick to do the same thereby effectively confusing the pilots.”

Since 18 July, heavy fighting has not been reported. “It is now over 4 months (since the campaign was launched on 13 March) and we have killed or wounded 800 of their soldiers for about 20 of ours (killed or wounded),” Bangkok Post, on 7 August 2011 issue, quoted the SSA’s Col Sai Htoo as saying.

One notable success of the Burma Army is that most of the main crossings on the Salween, which serve as gateways to its ally the United Wa State Army (UWSA) are now in the hands of the attacking forces.

The SSA however says its strategy is not fight a costly positional warfare but “hit hard, run and ambush.”

Mao Zedong, considered China’s 20th century military genius, was quoted a saying when the Kuomintang forces were poised to overrun his Yen’an base: “Keep the territory and lose the people, you’ll lose both. On the contrary, keep the people and lose the territory, you’ll have both”.

Please visit http://www.shanland.org for more articles from Shan Herald Agency for News who highlight issues in Burma (Myanmar) and regional nations.

http://www.shanland.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3923:burma-army-requests-return-of-seized-supplies&catid=86:war&Itemid=284

Troops besieging areas controlled by Mongla-based National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) are pulling out from at least 2 locations, according to NDAA sources.

At Mong Fan, south of Hsop Lwe, where the Lwe tributary joins the Mekong, only about 50 Burmese troops out of the original 200 in May remain. Durng the height of the tensions, in April and May, the NDAA was forced to withdraw from all of its bases south of Hsop Lwe: Wan Kho, Pong Hiet and Mong Fan.

It however refused to budge from Hsop Lwe, considered its only outlet to Laos and the outside world.

The Burma Army has also withdrawn its estimated 300 troops in the No Man’s Land between it and NDAA outposts in Mong Lwe, Mongyang township, on 1 August.

“They arrived on July 24 to explore some minerals, according to them,” said a source close to the Mongla leadership. “They retired on Monday, saying there weren’t any metal or mineral deposits worth investing.”

The Burma Army has also been pulling out their troops from around Wanhai, Kehsi township, where they had been fighting against the Shan State Army (SSA) North, one of Mongla’s allies. Only about 400 troops remain around the SSA’s main base.

“Despite the pullout, we are still maintaining our vigilance,” an NDAA officer was quoted as saying. “Because attack usually comes only when you become careless.We also think, after Wanhai falls, the Burma Army’s next target will be us. Then the Wa will be blockaded on all sides except in the east (China).”

It is not known why the Burma Army has decided to reduce its troops around Wanhai and Mongla. SHAN reported earlier that the Tatmadaw (Burma’s armed forces) has been facing internal problems, that has sapped its morale and fighting abilities. Former Military Intelligence officer Maj Aung Lynn Htut, who now resides in the United States, also reported that soldiers from Pegu Division-based Light Infantry Division (LID) 66 and LID 77 had been staging demonstrations saying they would not follow any orders unless their families were adequately fed and taken care of.

Please visit http://www.shanland.org for more articles from Shan Herald Agency for News who highlight issues in Burma (Myanmar) and regional nations.